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Abstract
This thesis examines the differences between probability matchers and utility maximizers in their
preferences for information sources in a lab environment. In this paper, we consider the best
source of information to be the most connected one. We conducted several linear probability
model type regressions along with logit regressions. Furthermore, we also attempted to control
and fix any potential misclassifications in classifying the cognitive strategy by using instrumental
variables. The results show that utility maximizers will almost always choose the most informed
node. Probability matchers, on the other hand, do not exhibit such a behavior as the probability
matching strategy shows that there is no difference between probability matchers and non-utility
maximizers. Furthermore, we find that even if we control for the type of network in which the
experiment is held, there is still no difference between the behavior of probability matchers and
non-utility maximizers whereas the behavior of utility maximizers shows that they will always
choose the most connected node.

5

I.

Introduction

Studying the social networks surrounding an individual’s actions not only give us
information on their beliefs, but they are also capable of giving us information on the source of
their belief as well as their prioritization for the information. To get a better understanding of
their prioritization for information, individuals in these social networks can be defined based on
their strategies. To better understand what we mean by prioritization of signals received by the
individual, we put forth this hypothetical scenario: say you and your partner decide to go out on a
dinner and want to go to the best restaurant in the area, there are several ways you can choose
what restaurant you and your partner would like to eat at. For instance, you could have read an
article from a famous food critic raving about this must try restaurant in your local area. On the
other hand, the growth of social media brought with it a growth in the number of influencers,
individuals that are more connected to other members of the community and they also are
signalling towards a different restaurant. Thus, the individual is given different sources of
information (the reviewer vs. the influencer) to choose from and their choice tells us about their
preferences for the sources of information as well as their learning. This thesis will focus on the
differences between how individuals who seek to maximize their utility and those who attempt to
probability match prioritize the signals they receive.
Before continuing, a proper definition of both those terms is necessary. These types of
behaviors are better understood with an example. Say a subject is given 8 green, 6 blue being
drawn randomly from a box with replacement. We refer to an individual as a probability matcher
if after 14 draws, they choose a color proportionate to the distribution of that color. In this
scenario, for instance, a probability matcher will choose the color green a 57% of the time. On
6

the other hand, an individual seeking to maximize their utility would choose the one with the
highest probability 100% of the time. Therefore, in the scenario above, a utility maximizer would
choose green all the time. Based on the example above, it shows us that there are two main ways
we can think of learning: either through expected utilities or through probability matching.
Furthermore, the example above implies that probability matching is a more cognitive process
because the individual that is taking part in this strategy has correctly (or incorrectly) reached a
conclusion about the distribution of the events within the game.
The aim of this thesis is to distinguish between the two types of strategies and attempt to
better understand the types of signal that each respective group prioritizes. The motivation
behind me writing this thesis is because in these situations, it has been observed that it is not
necessary that the players would converge to the optimal choice. In some cases, players ignore
their private signals and all their prior information and follow their predecessors. This
conundrum is best described by Kenneth Arrow (1958):
“We have here an experimental situation which is essentially of an economic nature in the
sense of seeking to achieve a maximum of expected reward, and yet the individual does not in
fact, at any point, even in a limit, reach the optimal behavior. I suggest that this result points out
strongly the importance of learning theory, not only in the greater understanding of the dynamics
of economic behavior, but even in suggesting that equilibria maybe be different from those that
we have predicted in our usual theory.”
The range of disciplines in which social structures are applicable ranges from behavioral
economics to finance to social psychology and game theory. The applications in behavioral
economics and social psychology being the most interconnected of the two as it would help us
7

better understand the decision-making process that a consumer goes through and its determinants
are. Additionally, in Finance, it might help us better understand the recent volatility occurring
within the stock market and especially the GameStop short squeeze of early 2021 in which there
were many individuals signalling towards buying the stock as opposed to the trained
professionals who shorted it. Continuing the research would help us learn not only why
individuals prioritize a certain signal over another but also to the major determinants in the
choice making experiment with repercussions in those respective fields and perhaps even more.
Additionally, empirical research has severely lagged behind the theoretical development of social
learning theory through social structures. Choi, Gallo and Kariv (2015) identify the challenges
behind the causal identification of the impact of a social structure on an individual's behavior and
therefore their prioritization of information within that network. The approach I am pursuing
with this thesis is an experimental approach that elicits peoples sources of information but also
includes a task that shows their cognitive thought-process with respect to the decision making
process. Additionally, having an experimental approach that coincides with a randomization in
assignment for the individuals in the study will allow us to identify a relationship between how
preferences for information sources affect the type of strategy adopted. Section III of this thesis
will go into more detail about the experiment.
Previous research into this field has primarily focused on information aggregation and
learning through social networks but this thesis is different in the sense that it will focus on what
types of information the individuals are taking into account before their decision making process.
In addition to that, Smith & Sorensen (2000) reached a conclusion similar to that of Kenneth
Arrow (1958) that agents start ignoring their private information and start conforming with the
crowd. However, that is a suboptimal outcome because actions aggregate information poorly and
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is suboptimal because they are ignoring their signal in favor of the actions of those previous to
them.
Section II of this thesis will go into further detail about the literature and past
experiments done with respect to this type of research. Section III will go in further depth about
the experiment conducted to attain the data and go into further detail about the different types of
networks used in the experiment.. Section IV outlines the regression analysis and a summary of
the findings. Section V of this thesis will talk about the method used to conduct the regression
analysis and Section VI will have a discussion on the results as well as a conclusion.
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II.

Literature Review

As previously mentioned, empirical research has lagged behind the theoretical aspect of
learning through social networks and therefore this thesis aims to bridge the gap between the
theoretical and applied aspects of social learning. Choi Gale and Kariv (2015) identify the reason
behind such a lag to be the challenges involved in the causal identification of the impact of
network structure on behavior and thereby affecting the identification of strategies. Ellison
(1993) and Morris (2000) show that in an evolutionary learning framework, players converge to
the risk-dominant equilibrium and they also concluded that convergence is quicker in complete
networks than it is in other types of networks. Additionally, Riedl et al. (2011) found that
subjects converge to the risk-dominant equilibrium when they are given their networks but
converge to the payoff-dominant equilibrium when they get to choose their networks.
On the topic of probability matching, Rothschild (1974) mentioned that it is quite likely
and possible for a rational yet impatient subject to choose the wrong side forever. We can think
about this outcome through the introductory example we used to explain probability matching
and utility maximization. If both subjects did not know the distribution of the balls in the hat and
observed 4 draws of the same color, they can incorrectly conclude that all the balls are going to
be of the same color and therefore choose it 100% of the time. This phenomenon could be
rationalized through the lens of receiving more of the wrong signals in the beginning of the
experiment and then assuming that this pattern will continue. To that subject, the outcome they
observe occurs more than 50% of the time, leading them to choose it 100% of the time, even
though it is completely wrong. This participant received a signal and interpreted it wrongly and
even though they attempted to probability match, they ended up with a strategy that is very
similar to that of a payoff-dominant (utility maximizer). If this participant succeeded with his
10

first four draws, then they will keep using that strategy until it proves wrong. Klaus Conrad
(1958) defines the act of attempting to find a pattern when none exists as Apophenia. He also
finds that it is an inherently human trait to try and find a pattern and attributes it to not having a
“built-in” pattern detection system. Statistically speaking, this phenomenon could also be
interpreted as a Type I error (false-positive) because the individual is seeing a pattern that is
non-existent.
Erev & Roth (1995) refer to that strategy as the law of effect: actions which had a positive
outcome are more likely to be used in the future when controlling for the situation. In his essay
book The Psychology of Judgment and Choice (1961) Restle concludes that regardless of
whether or not the subjects are told that the distribution of the signal is random, they will still
attempt to visualize and discern a pattern from randomness. This shows that participants would
almost always attempt to conceptualize and rationalize their choices in such situations.
In addition to that, and on the topic of loss and risk-aversion, Nobel prize winning
economist Thaler states in his book Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (2015)
that people have a diminishing sensitivity to both gains and losses. People are risk-averse of
gains but risk-seeking for losses. He reached that conclusion through posing the following
problems.
Problem 1:
a. You are given a choice of a sure gain of $100
b. 50% to gain $200 and 50% of losing $0.
Problem 2:
a. A sure loss of $100
b. 50% chance of losing $200 and a 50% chance of losing $0.
11

The results show that people are less risk-averse for their losses through having the
majority choose the sure gain in Problem 1 and the 50% chance of losing $200 in problem 2. To
conclude, people are more likely to choose the strategy that minimizes loss as opposed to
maximize utility. This could be explained through a psychological standpoint in the sense that
people are more attached to their belongings and are therefore less likely to be able to part ways
with them.
It is important to note that the type of learning model is related the type of cognitive
process that each individual makes and thereby their strategies. The two main learning models
are Bayesian and DeGroot. A Bayesian learning model is one in which the participants are
processing information using Bayes’ Law (Banerjee 1992). Furthermore, Mossel and Tamuz
(2010) as well as Gale and Kariv (2003) show that when some regularity conditions hold, a
Bayesian learning model implies that the participants will eventually converge to a consensus on
the state of the world they are in. On the other hand, the DeGroot learning model (DeGroot,
1974) is a model in which the agents take in a weighted average of the behavior and beliefs in
their situation and would take into account that weighted average as well as their private signal
when constructing their own belief. In a DeGroot learning model, communication of beliefs
helps learning as it would lead to convergence to the truth in large enough networks (Golub and
Jackson 2010). It is worth mentioning that this convergence is inefficient and actually converges
slowly to the truth (Golub and Jackson 2012). Additionally, at both the network and individual
levels, there is evidence that the uniform weighting DeGroot model better describes the observed
behavior than the Bayesian learning model (Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, Xandri 2015).
Moreover, in scenarios where the participants are able view the whole history of choices
made in the previous rounds, there tends to be a strategy of herding and cascading. We say
12

herding occurs in an experiment if players start to conform in their behavior over time, as in they
follow the actions of those near them or before them. An informational cascade occurs when the
players start ignoring their private signal after a set number of rounds. In addition to that, and as
stated previously, communication between participants plays a big role in the efficiency and
speed of convergence. One can think of herding as a type of convergence but it must be thought
of as an inefficient type of convergence because they arrive at a suboptimal decision. Also,
actions dissipate information poorly and the action of herding dissipates the same information
because the participants are ignoring their private signals and therefore herding does not
necessarily have to inform us of a new change within the system. However, Smith and Sorensen
(2000) found that if after a period of herding, a player chooses an action that is different from
that of their predecessors, the social beliefs about the type of world the participants are in
changes drastically and therefore changes the herding behavior altogether. Additionally, they also
concluded that in complete network structures, herding and cascading will always emerge.
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III.

The Experiment

The experiment is set up in such a way that there is a true state of the world that we
would like the participants to reach a conclusion on. Each participant’s payoffs depend on their
knowledge of what that true state is, irrespective of what the other participants beliefs or actions.
To begin, each participant gets a partially informative, private signal about the true state and
participants are arranged in networks and restricted to only being able to observe their neighbors’
actions. After repeated interactions with their neighbors, the participants can update their own
beliefs on the true state of the world. The exogenous manipulation of network structures allows
us to identify the impact of network structure on learning.
These sessions ran at three different universities and each session included 10 matches
with a network structure that was held constant throughout those 10 matches. Participants were
given a monetary incentive to participate in the experiment and were also given additional
money to incentivise them to choose the correct output and to make sure they are actively
engaged in the experiment.
IIIA. The Networks:
Before continuing with the experiment, an explanation of the types of network structures
is imperative to our understanding of how different networks lead to rises in different strategies.
There are several different types of social structures that can be split into two types: Classic and
Complex networks. The most common types of classic networks are the Star and Complete
System. In the star network, one centrally connected node is connected to the other nodes but the
other nodes are only connected to the central node. A complete network is one in which all
participants are connected to each other and therefore there is a full flow of information.
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Fig. 1: The Star and Complete Network Structures

As seen in the figure above, simple network structures generally involve one network in which
all the participants are either connected to each other or connected to a central node. It is
important to note that in the Star networks, the central node is the only node that is connected to
the other participants whereas in the complete network all participants are able to view the
actions of the other participants.
Complex Networks, on the other hand, can best be described as a mixture of the classical
networks with certain alterations.
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Fig. 2: Example of Complex Networks1

From above, we can think of Two Cores: One Link as two distinct simple networks in which we
allow communication between them but only with respect to one node. Whereas we can think of
the One Gatekeeper network as a link between a Star network and a Complete network.
This discussion on the different types of networks and differentiating between the
differences within the network types themselves helps us to understand that each different
network type would lead to different learning outcomes and will therefore impact probability
matching and even utility maximization strategies due to their location. Furthermore, the type of
network dictates the type of information the participants can receive from the network and
therefore affects their prioritization of information sources.
IIIB. The Learning Task
The agents are randomly assigned to a position within the network and a binary state of
the world is realized. After that, each participant is given a private signal with accuracy of 70%.
The agents can observe the history of the decisions made by the neighboring participants and

1

Appendix 1B will have graphs of all the Complex Networks in this experiment.
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then can guess the state. This process keeps reiterating until either a convergence is reached or
after more than 50 rounds without a convergence. We say a convergence is reached if there are
no changes in the guesses of the participants in the past three rounds. Additionally, each
experiment included an observer whose task was to observe the history of the guesses by the
neighbors before making their choice, this is what we defined to be the learning process.
I will go into further detail about the results of the experiment because I believe that it
will help us understand the prioritization of sources of information by the participants. The
experiment found that the variation in network-level outcomes is correlated with the structure of
the network itself and that wider networks would take longer to converge to a decision on the
true state of the world. Furthermore, the experiment found that in a network like One Gatekeeper
where we have a central node (hub), the central node affects and complicates the aggregation of
information to the other noncentral nodes within the network, this is likely due to the reliance of
non-hub nodes on the accuracy of the hub node itself. They also found that almost all the
networks within the experiment converged after 5 rounds and that networks with weakly
connected cores are less likely to reach a consensus.

IIIC. Eliciting Risk Preferences of Cognitive Models
The second part of the experiment involved doing four different tasks The first task was
to guess the color of 5 cards drawn independently from a deck of 100 cards with the following
distribution. The cards were distributed as follows: 36 green, 25 blue, 22 yellow and 17 brown.
The task was to guess the color of the five cards that were drawn, and if chosen correctly the
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participant would receive 50 cents for each correct guess. The variables corresponding to each of
the five guesses is Guess XA, where X refers to the color of choice amongst the five.
The second task involved 9 rounds but was very similar in structure to the first one: guess
the color of a ball randomly chosen by the computer given that 2 balls were red and one is black;
each correct guess yields 25 cents in monetary rewards. The naming of these variables in the
second task was Guess X where X is the round number.
The third and fourth tasks were measures of risk tolerance and aversion, each participant
is endowed with 100 points worth 2 dollars and they are given the choice of whether or not to
invest in a risky investment with an assigned probability of success. In task 3 the probability that
the risky investment is successful is 50% and if the participant chooses to invest, they can either
earn 2.5x their initial investment or lose it all. Whereas the 4th task assigned the probability of
success to 40% and a multiplier of 3x if the investment is successful. The variables for both tasks
3 and 4 were how much they invested and how much they decided to keep.
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IV.

The Data

Because this thesis focuses on how each cognitive strategy affects the choice of
information, we needed to create indicators for utility maximizers and probability matchers. In
order to identify who is a utility maximizer and who is a probability matcher, we created a binary
variable corresponding to their choices in the first two tasks. A utility maximizer in the first
round would be one that chose the green card all five times whereas a utility maximizer in the
second round is one that chose red all nine times. We then identified a strict utility maximizer as
one who attempted to utilize that strategy in both tasks. A similar approach was used to discern
probability matchers, however, the only difference was that probability matchers would choose
green and red with the same probability as the distribution of those colors with respect to the
distribution of the other colors. A utility maximizer in task one was recorded as util_max1,
whereas a task two utility maximizer was labeled as util_max2 and the participant that attempted
that strategy in both tasks is util_max. The same labeling scheme was used for probability
matchers.
Furthermore, because we want to analyze how the strategy used in tasks 1 and 2 affect
their choice of information sources, we need to create a dummy variable corresponding to the
most connected node and whether or not the participants chose the most connected node in their
network. Since we are analyzing the most connected node, we omitted the networks Complete 18
and Complete 9 because all the nodes in that are equally connected to the other nodes and
therefore would introduce bias to our regression. Below is a table of the summary statistics for
each group.2

2

A correlation matrix is included in Appendix III of this thesis
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics based on Network Type.
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V. The Methods
After creating the variables, we ran regressions with the dependent variable being the
binary variable most_connected which indicates whether or not the participants chose the most
highly connected node in their respective networks. From the experiment, the most connected
node is the most informed one as it is able to elicit responses from other nodes, this represents
the best choice. In our first models, we chose the independent variables to be the strict utility
maximization and probability matching strategies, that is participants who used those strategies
in both tasks 1 and 2. After that, another linear probability model was run with the following
variables: (strict) util_max, (strict) prob_match, keeps_30 as well as an interaction between the
strict util_max, prob_match with keeps_30. We use keeps_30 in the regression to see if their
cognitive strategy is in any way related to their risk aversion. The models are as follows:

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 1:
𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = β0 + β1𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2:
𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = β0 + β1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 3:
𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = β0 + β1𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + β2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 4:
𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = β0 + β1𝑢𝑡𝑖l_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + β2𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30 + β3𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑥×𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 5:
𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = β0 + β1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ + β2𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30 + β3𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ×𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 6:
𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = β0 + β1𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙_max
+ β2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ + β3𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30 + β4𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑥×𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30 + β5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ×𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠30
21

VA. Linear Model Results

N = 1,082

Model 1

Model 2

Intercept

0.50***
(0.017)

util_max

0.22***

0.22***

0.24***

0.22***

(0.034)

(0.018)

(0.0623)

(0.032)

prob_match

Model 3

Model 4

0.58***

0.51***

0.53***

0.62***

0.55***

(0.017)

(0.0099)

(0.035)

(0.0157)

(0.019)

-0.020

-0.20***

-0.13**

(0.038)

(0.0196)

(0.0439)

(0.045)

-3.9E-4

8.3 E-4**

-7.6 E-4*

(5.9 E-4)

(2.7 E-4)

(3.3 E-4)

-4.5 E-4

util_max *
keeps_30

-6.2 E-5
(5.5 E-4)

(5.3 E-4)

prob_match*
keeps_30
0.0372

Model 6

-0.087*

keeps_30

Pseudo-R2

Model 5

0.00473

.03745

0.0384

2.1 E-3**

2.1 E-3**

(7.3 E-4)

(7.5 E-4)

0.0077

0.0407

Table 1.2: Regression outputs for strict utility maximizers and strict probability matchers
*** is significance at the 1%, ** is significance at the 5% level, * is significance at the 10% level

As seen from the regression table above that corresponds to six different regressions. The
coefficient for utility maximizers hovers around 0.22, meaning that despite the addition of certain
control variables, a utility maximizer is around 22% more likely to choose the most connected
node when compared to non-utility maximizers. On the other hand, a probability matcher is less
likely to choose the most connected node, however, adding more control variables affects the
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probability of choosing the most connected node. We find that when we run a linear probability
model on most connected and probability matchers, we see that they are 9% less likely to choose
the most connected node. Keep in mind that Model 2 lumps utility maximizers and the
unclassified participants, which explains why the variable is statistically significant. Regardless
of the magnitude of the effect, we can conclude that a probability matcher is less likely to choose
the most centrally connected node when compared to non-probability matchers. Furthermore, in
Model 6 we find that although the interaction between prob_matchers and the risk aversion
metric (keeps_30) is statistically significant, it is not empirically significant as it can increase the
probability of choosing the most connected node by at most 2%.
VB. Accounting for Noisy Classifications
Since we tried to estimate utility maximization in tasks 1 and 2 using strict utility
maximization and likewise for probability matchers, this led to an imperfect approximation of
utility maximization and probability matching. To account for measurement error, we attempted
to use util_max1 as an instrument for util_max2 and likewise of prob_match1 and prob_match2.
The technique is called Obviously Related Instrumental Variables (Gillen et al. 2018) or ORIV, a
method in which we run a regression of util_max1 on util_max2 and util_max2 on util_max1 and
use those fitted values in a stacked regression. These repeated iterations allow us to address the
noise in the approximation using ORIV. After accounting for measurement error using ORIV, we
ran the regression models seen in Section VA of this thesis, the results are in the following table
(1.3).
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N = 1,082

Model 1a

Model 2a

Model 3a

Model 4a

Model 5a

intercept

0.33***

0.634***

0.3624***

0.33***

0.73***

0.40***

(0.053)

(0.035)

(0.04119)

(0.078)

(0.062)

(0.08121)

util_max

0.51***

0.51***

0.63***

0.60***

(0.088)

(0.084)

(0.156)

(0.1491)

prob_match

Model 6a

-0.120**

-9.359 E-3

-0.36**

-0.14

(0.069)

(0.05442)

(0.13)

(0.1075)

keeps_30

-5.3 E-4

-1.7 E-3

-7.4 E-4

(6.8 E-4)

(1.1 E-3)

(1.4 E-3)

util_max *
keeps_30

-2.5 E-3

-1.8 E-3

(2.7 E-3)

(2.6 E-3)

prob_match*
keeps_30
Pseudo-R2

0.0377

0.00404

0.0380

0.040

3.2 E-3

2.6 E-3

(2.2 E-3)

(1.8)

0.0061

0.040

Table 1.3: Regression outputs using the ORIV method for measurement error
*** is significance at the 1%, ** is significance at the 5% level, * is significance at the 10% level

As seen from the regression table above, we can conclude that utility maximization will increase
the probability of choosing the most connected node in the network by at least 50%. It is also
worth noting that probability matchers do not exhibit any different behavior than non-probability
matchers with respect to the choosing most connected node. Additionally, the intercept
coefficient along with the coefficient for utility max leads to a probability of choosing the most
connected node to almost 84% in Model 1a and when we added more controls in Models 4a, 6a
we find that the probability of choosing the most informed node is almost 100%. Looking at
Model 2a, we can conclude that probability matching decreases the probability of choosing the
most connected node. When accounting for measurement error, we find that probability matchers
are around 50% likely to choose the most connected node.
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We also notice that accounting for measurement error corrects for attenuation based on
the correlation between the repeated elicitations. Furthermore, all models lead us to the
conclusion that the difference is mainly between utility maximizers and everyone else. Although
probability matchers are different from non-probability matchers (utility maximizers included),
controlling for utility maximizer’s behavior shows that there is no significant difference between
probability matchers and non-probability matchers in their tendency to choose the most
connected and informed node in the network. Model 2a clusters utility maximizers with everyone
else and therefore we see a statistically significant coefficient for probability matching because
we are comparing probability matchers to everyone else. Lastly, we find that although we
accounted for measurement error in parts VA, VB; we still arrive at roughly the same
probabilities using both methods for both models.
VC. Additional Robustness Checks
In addition to running these regressions above, we also ran a logit regression and found
that the results are largely the same to those in Section VA. Additionally, we ran a fixed effects
regression using the ORIV method with the network type as the fixed effects and found that the
results were mainly in line with our results from Model 6a, with the type of network being not
statistically significant and with little to no effect on the coefficients for util_max and
prob_match. As a final robustness check, we also ran a regression where we controlled for
gender and network fixed effects with the results being qualitatively very similar to those found
in Table 1.3. The results of these regressions are included in the Appendix.
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VD. Summary of Results
To summarize the results of both regression tables, we can conclude that
utility_maximizers will almost certainly choose the most connected node all the time, as was
expected from them and concurs with the discussion in Section I of this thesis. Probability
matchers, on the other hand, do not exhibit patterns in any different way than non-probability
matchers when controlling for risk aversion.
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VI. Conclusion
From the results we have seen in the previous of this thesis, we can conclude that in a lab
experiment, utility maximizers will almost always choose the most connected node. Meaning
that a utility maximizer will seek to maximize their utility by choosing the node that they believe
has the highest probability of having the true state. Since they are attempting to maximize their
utility (or in this case their profits/earnings), they will choose the node that has the most
information due with a probability of almost 100%. Accounting for measurement error using
their strategy in the first task as an instrument for their strategy in their second hand, and vice
versa, shows us that given certain constraints and rules, utility maximizers will choose to
disregard their private signals given to them at the beginning of the experiment in favor of
maximizing their payoffs. To them, it is considered somewhat of a binary question as opposed to
one of choice since they will ignore any node that is not as connected. Furthermore, we see from
our results that probability matchers do not have a strict method of choosing their node. In other
words, a probability matcher is the same as a non-probability matcher when it comes to choosing
the most connected node in the network.
Going forwards, in the future, if given the chance I would conduct another model in
which I test the choice for the most central node and see whether or not there is a difference
between probability matchers and utility matchers with respect to choosing a node that is more
centrally located as opposed to one that is more connected than others.
As I stated earlier in this thesis, the application of these results has a wide variety of
fields in which this can be applied to. In neuroeconomics, for instance, we see that utility
maximizers exhibit behavior that is very similar to that of non-risk averse people in the sense that
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they will choose the most connected node regardless of whether or not they lost previously. That
being said, the scale in which the experiment was conducted with regards to risk aversion is a
rather small one due to the monetary value being $2. I think that if the stakes were higher utility
maximizers might exhibit different behavior simply because the loss of $2 is not a significant
loss, all things considered. A counterargument to this is that those $2 that they received in the
game are an example of “unclaimed earnings” in which the utility maximizer or probability
matcher is not investing their own money, they are investing someone else’s money and therefore
the hypothetical losses that stem from a bad investment are unmaterialized and they would only
gain if the investment turns out to be successful. A limitation to this is that it is borderline
impossible to conduct an experiment in which the participants put any of their money, but I
would argue that it would incentivize them to be more cognizant of their decisions and more
aware of the actions of their neighbors and predecessors.
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Appendix
Appendix IA. The Different Types of Classic Networks

Fig 4: The Star 18 Network

Fig 5: The Complete-18 Network
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Appendix IB. The Different Types of Complex Networks

Fig 6: Two Cores: Three Links Network

Fig 7: Single Mediator Network
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Fig 8: Two Groups Network
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Appendix II: Additional Robustness Checks
Controlling for Gender and Network Type

N = 1082

Linear Probability Model

Log Likelihood

intercept

0.23***
(0.0073)

-1.1***
(0.32)

util_max

0.48***
(0.0083)

2.09***
(0.38)

prob_match

-5.8 E-3
(0.052)

-0.035
(0.23)

keeps_30

-6.9 E-5
(-6.8 E-4)

-0.00034
(0.0031)

male

0.15***
(0.042)

0.66***
(0.19)

Complex Two Groups

0.0082
(0.0077)

0.35
(0.33)

Equal Cores

0.11
(0.78)

0.47
(0.34)

One Gate

0.003
(6.9 E-2)

0.13
(0.30)

Single Mediator

0.0046
(0.007)

0.20
(0.30)

Star 18

0.0029
(0.003)

0.13
(0.33)

Star 6

0.18**
(0.0024)

0.80**
(0.29)

Pseudo-R2

0.078

0.059

Table 1.4: LPM and Logit regressions using ORIV controlling for Gender and and Network Type
*** is significance at the 1%, ** is significance at the 5% level, * is significance at the 10% level
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Logit Regression
N = 1,082

Intercept

util_max

Model
1

Model 2

0.03

0.32***

(0.07)

(0.068)

0.95***

0.93***

1.1***

0.99***

(0.15)

(0.16)

(0.29)

(0.3)

prob_match

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.050

0.11

0.49***

0.20

(0.082)

(0.035)

(0.13)

(0.16)

-0.35*

-0.079

-0.81*

-0.52

(0.15)

(0.16)

(0.36)

(0.37)

keeps_30

-0.0015

-0.0034

-0.0031

(0.0024)

(0.022)

(0.0027)

util_max *
keeps_30

-0.0027

prob_match*
keeps_30
Pseudo-R2

-0.0012
(0.005)

(0.0048)

0.028

0.0039

.028

0.029

0.0087

0.0084

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.0056

0.0031

Table 1.5:Logit regressions using strict probability matching and strict utility maximization
*** is significance at the 1%, ** is significance at the 5% level, * is significance at the 10% level
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Logit
Regression w/
ORIV
N = 1,082

Intercept

util_max

Model 1a

Model 2a

Model 3a

Model 4a

Model 5a

Model 6a

-0.59

0.32***

0.36***

0.33***

0.73***

-0.43

(0.16)

(0.068)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.38)

(0.33)

2.1***

0.51***

0.63***

2.6***

(0.388)

(0.041)

(0.15)

(0683)

prob_match

-0.35*

-0.0094

-0.36***

-0.62

(0.15)

(0.048)

(0.095)

(0.37)

keeps_30

-0.0005

-0.0018**

-0.0029

(0.0013)

(0.00065)

(0.0057)

util_max *
keeps_30

-0.0025

prob_match*
keeps_30
Pseudo-R2

-0.0090
(0.011)

(0.0047)

0.028

0.0039

.028

0.029

0.0032*

0.011

(0.0016)

(0.0076)

0.0056

0.0031

Table 1.6:Logit regressions using ORIV
*** is significance at the 1%, ** is significance at the 5% level, * is significance at the 10% level
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Appendix III: Correlation Matrix
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